 SECRET

February 10, 1948

STATE DEPARTMENT MEMO

Allocation of Responsibility for the Production of Scientific and Technological Intelligence

For some time there has been felt a need for clarification of responsibilities in the fields of scientific and technological intelligence. The problem was under discussion during the preparation of the NIA and NSC directives, but was treated in general fashion rather than in an attempt to detail responsibilities.

The problem involves both the collection of scientific and technological information in the field and the production, in Washington, of scientific intelligence required by the various departments and agencies. The NSC collection directive which establishes the principles for field coordination of all types of information provides no basic means for tackling the overseas part of the problem. On the other hand, it seems that existing arrangements in Washington do little to give a clear picture of the scientific information available to the government, or of the intelligence research being conducted in scientific and related fields. It appears, therefore, that the next and most urgent task is establishing some machinery for actually collecting information, which must be of a selective and economical character, while simultaneously coordinating the production of scientific intelligence.

The subject is broad and complex and the requirements of the interested departments and agencies differ markedly. The direct interest of the Department of State is perhaps slight, but its intelligence organization has responsibility for certain economic intelligence which derives from scientific and technological matters and is an important, if peripheral, element in scientific intelligence. I refer, for example, to intelligence research in electric power, chemical industries, etc.

The problem might be attacked from three standpoints: (a) to ascertain the work in this field now under way in the various departments and agencies; (b) to seek to categorize scientific and technological intelligence by definition into integral parts; and (c) to assign, by agreement, responsibility for the several segments involved. It is believed that agreement must first be reached on those basic elements of the problem before progress can be made toward ascertaining and meeting the specific requirements of policy makers for finished intelligence in the scientific field. Assignment of direct responsibility will go far towards establishing the means for minimizing duplication and for concerting in the preparation of the scientific intelligence so urgently needed by certain parts of the Federal structure.

State, NSC declassification & release instructions on file

(Attachment A)

 SECRET

 SECRET

FIRST PROPOSAL

Note: This proposal is not to be considered to include all instructions necessary, but to provide the basis for further study and recommendation by the Standing Committee of the Intelligence Advisory Committee.

SECRET
NSCID 9
8 March 1948

PROPOSED NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 9

SCIENTIFIC ATTACHES

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102(d)(4) of the National Security Act and in amplification of paragraph 1, NSCID No. 2, the National Security Council hereby authorizes and directs that:

1. The shall appoint especially qualified Scientific Attaches to the U. S. Missions in countries having the greatest scientific and technological potential.

2. Generally, such Attaches will function and be administered in a manner similar to other Attaches.

3. The primary purpose of these Attaches is to collect intelligence information on scientific matters, fundamental research, and applied research and development which transcends the competence and/or responsibility of the other Attaches.

4. To avoid unprofitable duplication and to assure the maximum collection effort in those fields of common interest, these Attaches will work in close collaboration with the other Attaches.

(ATTACHMENT B)

 SECRET